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STATE OF UITIH 
-----------------
JOHN M. ALEXANDER and 
i!ELEN ALEXANDER, 
Plaintiffs-ResIX>ndents, 
vs. 
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case No. 17,339 
BRIEF OF APPELUINT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs brought this action for breach of a:mtract and, in the 
alternative, fraud. They sought damages for the alleged failure of the 
defendants to canply with the tenns of an Earnest M:lney Agreement for 
the sale of real estate. Plaintiffs allege that the defendants failed 
to improve a side street. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER CDURT 
Th.is case was tried before the Fourth Judicial District Court in 
and for Utah County, on June 19, 1980, with the Hororable Allen B. 
Sorensen, District Judge, presiding. 
In his Judgrrent of September 5, 1980, Judge Sorensen awarded the 
Plaintiffs damages in the arrount of $4,500.00, plus attorney's fees in 
t!'.e arrount of $960. 00, and costs in the arrount of $27. 50. (For Judge 
2crensen' s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of I.aw, and Judgrrent, see 
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r. 102-107). 
RELIEF SOUGHI' ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek a reversal of the lower =urt' s judgrrent in favor 
of the plaintiffs. 
Defendants request this =urt to reverse the ruling holding the 
Earnest MJney Agreerrent to be unambiguous on its face. 
In the event that the defendants are found liable in any way to th 
plaintiffs, it is requested that the decision of the lower court with 
regard to the am::>unt of damages be reversed. It is contended that clairac-, 
should be calculated as of the time when performance was due and the 
breach occured, rather than as of some later time. 
I~ is also requested, in the event that the defendants are found 
liable, that the airount of attorney's fees awarded be reduced so as rot 
to include airounts in=red because of mistakes on the part of plainti:': 
former counsel. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In 1972 and 1973, the defendants were engaged in developing a srraL 
subdivision in southwest Provo, Utah, which became known as the Fanc~t:: 
lanes subdivision. 
Plaintiffs became aware of the lots that were for sale in the 
subdivision through a newspaper advertisement (r. 126). Plaintiffs 
contacted Eoyd Sorensen, who was the real estate agent representing 
defendants in the sale of these lots (r .127) . Plaintiffs had no dealJJ." 
with defendants in this matter (r. 127), but had several conversatio!IE 
with Mr. Sorensen concerning the purchase of a lot (r. 169-171l · 
t ~bf' On or about November 26, 1973, plaintiffs executed an Eames · 
f an defenGJr· Receipt and Offer to Purchase in which they agreed to buy r 
2 
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?rofB"tY located in the Ranchette Lanes Sub::livision. 'nle lot which 
ciaintiffs agreed to buy was fronted by a street known as 1920 West . 
. \long the side of the lot ran a short dead end street which was desig-
~ated 460 south (r. 129. See also plaintiff's Exhibit #5). 
The Earnest M:>ney Agreerrent, which was accepted into evidence as 
~laintiffs' Exhibit No. 2, contained, arrong other things, a list of 
fOSsible ~roverrEnts which could be provided on or appurtenant to the 
proFffl:Y. 'nlis list was found on lines 29, 30 and 31 of the printed 
agreerrent. Beside each possible irnproverrEnt was a small box or square 
in which marks could be rrade indicating whether or not the seller was 
resp:msible for providing that irnproVerrEnt. An "X" in this box indicated 
!:hat the seller was responsible for the irnproverrent. An "O" in this 
::Ox indicated that the seller was not responsible for this irnproverrent . 
• '11 "X" had been placed in the boxes next to the words "sidewalk", "curb 
llld gutter", and "special street paving" , a.wng others. 
Paving and =b and gutter were provided by the seller on both 
sides of the street known as 920 West, which was the rrain street of the 
sub:livision and the only one which connected with other city streets (r. 129). 
However, none of these irnprovanents were provided by the seller on 
<fa seller on the dead end side street designated 460 South (r. 129-30. 
See also plaintiff's Exhibit #5) . Neither have the plaintiffs improved 
:1eir side of this street, although their neighbors across 460 South 
\ave improved their side with paverrent and curb and gutter by the use of 
a 5Pecial improvement district (r. 33. See also plaintiff's Exhibit #5). 
No demand was made directly upon the defendants by the plaintiffs 
:Jr these improvements until a letter was sent by their counsel in July 
if 1977, approximately four years after the agreanent was signed (r. 179-80) · 
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This action was ccmrenced by a Complaint dated September 19 10 , 
' ,,,71 
(r. 2). 
This Complaint was subsequently arrended because it was the opinio~. 
of the plaintiffs' counsel, after reviewing the facts, that the origir;_ 
Complaint did not state a cause of action which could be Supp:Jrted, Ir. , 
'I 
The Amended Complaint was filed with the District Court on Novernl::er 2 ~ 1 / 
1979 (r. 68-71). 
At the trial, which was held on June 19, 1980, evidence was heard 
concerning the anount of damages, which was presumed to be the cost of 
paving the unpaved portion of the street in question, as of 1973, wher, 
the defendants provided improvements (r. 177-78) . Evidence was also 
heard concerning the cost of paving in the fall of 1976 (r. 163), a:-.d 
as of the present time (r. 151). 
Evidence was presented to indicate that the cost of providing thesi 
improvements has gone up drastically in the time between the purchase o: 
the lot and the present (r. 152, 176-77). 
The Judgment of the Court entered on September 5, 1980, awardedar: 1 
anount of damages corresponding to the evidence concerning the cost of [ 
improvements as of 1976 (See: r. 106, 163). The attorney's fees awardeJ: 
by the court were approxirrately the full anount requested by the plaint': 
which. included arrounts charged for the time spent in preparing the 
defective Complaint (See: r. 164, 106) 
Therei"_fter, defendants properly perfected this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WP£, ! 
THE CONI'RACT, AS TO STREET IMPROVEMENTS, WAS AMBIGUOUS AND IT. ! 
ENCE Of I 
THEREFORE, ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURI' TO EXCLUDE CXMPEI'ENT EVID 
4 
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I 
.._ 
1llE INI'ENT AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE PARrIES. 
rt is well established and not contested that a court must look first 
to the contract itself to detennine its neaning. lbwever, it is equally 
Wllll established that if a contract is vague, ar!'biguous, or in any way 
unclear, and when no contemporaneous docurrents are available to aid in 
its interpretation, the court nay resort to extrinsic evidence to detennine 
what the intent of the parties was. Thus, the Utah Supreme Court in 
EWell and Sons, Inc. v. Salt Iake City Co:q;oration, 27 Utah 2d. 188, 493 
P.2d 1283 (1972), said: 
It is elementary that whenever there is uncertainty 
or incompleteness with respect to what the rights and 
duties under a contract are, it is pennissible to receive 
collateral evidence to detennine those natters. 
Similarly, in Radley v. Smith, 6 Utah 2d 314, 313 P.2d 465 (1957), the 
rourt held that: 
Whenever uncertainty or ambiguity exists with respect 
(to the terns of an agreement and the intent of the parties) 
it is proper for the Court to consider all of the facts and 
circumstances, including the '\\Ords and actions of the parties 
fanning the background of a transaction. 
The Utah Supreire Court in E.A. Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc. v. 
Brc<lerick, 522 P.2d 144 (1974) listed the rrore camcn grounds for introduction 
of parole evidence to aid in the interpretation of contracts. Said the 
Court at 145: 
"Parole evidence nay be received to clarify ambiguous language 
in a contract, to show what the agreement was relative to filling 
in blanks, and to supply omitted terns which were agreed upon 
but inadvertantly left out of the written agreerrent." 
(See also: Milford State Bank v. Westfield canal and Irrigation 
~ .. 108 Utah 528, 162 P.2d 101 (1945); Western Developnent Carpany 
~Nell, 4 Utah 2d 112, 288 P.2d 452 (1955); M:Jon Lake Water Users Ass'n 
~,Utah, 535 P.2d 1262 (1975); Oberhansly v. Earle, Utah 572 
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P.2d 1384 (1977); Wingets v. Bitters, 28 Utah 2d 231, 500 P.2d lOO; 
(1972)). 
A case particularly applicable to the one at bar is Continent.: 
--= 
Bank and Trust Co. v. Stewart, 4 Utah 2d 228, 291 P.2d 890 (195S). • 
that case, an agreement for the sale of real property provided tliat. i 
·1 
purchaser was to pay the debts of the vendor. The action was by a ~-
party beneficiary to that agreement against the purchaser to COTIFel 
payment of sane of the debts which the vendor owed the third party .• 
question presented was whether parole evidence should be admitted tc 
prove which debts of the vendor were intended to be covered by the 
agreement. The court held that, since the contract did not specify 
which debts were to be paid by the purchaser, the term was unclear fil: 
ambiguous and the intent of the parties with relation thereto couldk 
detennined by reference to parole or extrinsic evidence. Said the 
Court: 
"In view of the lack of definiteness in the terms of 
the contract, it was proper for the court to receive extranrois ! 
evidence as to its meaning. " 
The Supreme Court of Wyaning faced a case silllilar to the instant I 
one in Kilbourne-Park Corp. v. Buckingham, Wyoming, 404 P.2d 244 11%: 
In that case a contract required the plaintiff, for a specified 5\ITI,: 
complete all roadways as platted in a certain subdivision. Plaintii'. 
brought an action seeking recovery of the balance due under the contr: I 
claiming that he had fully performed but had not been fully paid .. ~'-11 
· d s admJ.SSib,, 
of the questions presented was whether parole evi ence wa ! 
supplement and explain the written agreement by helping to detenIDne 
which roads had been contracted to be built. The Court allowed such 
evidence holding that: 
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"It is imnediately apparent that parole evidence was 
requjred to establish what subdivision plat delineated 
the roads then being contracted to be built and what was 
the full understanding of the parties as to which roads 
were being contracted for." 
The disputed tenn contained in the contract in this case contains 
nothing but a list of possible :improverrents for which the seller may be 
responsible, and a check or "X" by certain of them. This criptic reference 
to the seller's responsibility refers to certain :improverrents just as 
the contract in Continental Bank referred to certain debts. These 
references suffer fran the sarre ambiguity. Both are in very general 
tenns. Neither specifies the items, or the type or number of items, 
referred to. In both cases, therefore, parole evidence is properly 
admissible to detennine the intent of the parties. 
The contract in Kilbourne-Park required the :improvement of streets 
which were refe=ed to but not identified. The court properly allowed 
parole evidence to establish the full understanding of the parties as to 
which roads were being contracted for. The contract in the case at bar 
suffers fran precisely this sarre ambiguity. 
Logically, this reference to :improvanents in the contract \o4Uuld 
seem to refer only to main streets or streets which, in the contemplation 
of both parties, would be used for traffic and access to and fran the 
houses. It is not reasonable to suppose that this tell!I could be interpreted 
to require that every alley or sideway be paved and curbed and guttered. 
At least it must be admitted that the meaning of this tellll is unclear 
enough that extrinsic evidence ought to be admitted to detelllline the 
intent of the parties with reference to it. 
ln addition, the only paving required by this term is "special" 
paving. The word "special" is never defined in the agreement, but it 
7 
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does not seem logically to refer to any sort of paving on any str~· 
sideway whatsoever. This tenn is particularly ambiguous and [lart;:_, 
requires parole evidence for interpretation. 
J.s this court said in Wingets Inc. v. Bitters, 28 Utah 2d 2L 
P.2d 1007 (1972): 
"If. there is a J;iasis in (the language of the contract) 
up:m which the parties reasonably could have a rnisimderstiii 
with respect to its intent, then extraneous evidence can be-
received and considered to ascertain it. MJreover, in rrakir.: 
that determination, the Court is not round by any single 
provision of expression, but srould l=k to the whole amtr;~ 
and its purpose. " 
Thus, all facts and circumstances srould be considered to aic 
Court in interpreting a contract term as vague and uncertain in i:; 
meaning as the present one. This the trial court failed to do, ar: 
this the trial court erred. 
POINT II 
THE CONTRACT WAS NOT AN INI'ffiRATION Jl.s TO THE SIDE STPEE!'S BL'.: 
IT WAS NEVER INI'ENDED TO REFER TO THE SIDE STREETS. EVIDENCE S!lJC 
HAVE BEEN ADMITTED B01'H TO PROVE THE SUBJECTS INTENDED TO BE ())\IERc 
THE CONTRACT AND TO SHOW THE INI'ENTION OF THE PARI'IES TOWARD THOS: 
SUBJECTS Nor COVERED BY THE CONTRACT. 
A contract is an integration designed to be the final \\llrd oi · 
parties as to the subjects which it covers. Admittedly, parole e',{' 
is not admissible as to these subjects if they are covered in a c:~ 
. j 
and unambiguous way. However, this general rule cannot. be broU!J:; :~ 
play until trose subjects al:xlut which the contract was wtended -- , 
integration are identified. The parole evidence rule, then, apPL 
. W' 
only to evidence arout trose subjects. Thus, t.':.e Utah court lI1 _,, ! 
v. Wasatch Chemical Co., 104 Utah 272, 143 P.2d 281 (19431 qwte' 
8 
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Section 24 30 of Wigrrore on Evidence as follows: 
"The inquiry is whether the writing was intended to oover 
a certain subject of negotiation; for if it was not, then the 
writing does not eml:ody the transaction on that subject •.. Whether 
a particular subject of negotiation is embodied by the writing 
depends wholly uµ:m the intent of the parties thereto ••• This 
intent must be sought .•. in the conduct and language of the parties 
and the surrounding circumstances .•• The question being whether 
certain subjects of negotiation were intended to be covered, we 
must canpare the writing and the negotiations before we can 
determine whether they were in fact covered ... " 
'Ihe rule that parole evidence is allowable in an initial inquiry as 
to the subjects intended to be oovered by the contract has been accepted 
in other jurisdictions as well; (See: Aztec Film Productions v. Tucson 
Gas & Electric Co., ll Ariz. App. 241, 463 P.2d 547 (1969); Peter Pan 
Seafoods, Inc. v. Olympic Foundary Company, 17 Wash. App. 761, 565 P.2d 
819 (1977) ; Hatley v. Stafford, 284 Or. 523, 588 P. 2d 603 (1978) ) . 
In this case, it is certainly questionable that the contract was 
intended to refer to these side streets at all. No evidence was allowed 
or admitted indicating that it was. Indeed, evidence was preferred 
which 1-Kluld indicate that it was st:ecifically agreed by both parties 
that this agreerrent did not refer to the side streets, and that improve-
rrents to the side streets were, therefore, not the responsibility of the 
defendants. This evidence was excluded by the trial court. It should 
have been admitted as evidence relevant to the initial inquiry concerning 
the subjects intended to be covered by the contract. Its exclusion was, 
therefore, error. 
PO:rnT III 
IF A BREAQ! IS FOUND, THE TIME AS OF WHEN THE DAMAGES SHOULD BE 
CA1.CurATED IS THE TIME WHEN PERFORMANCE WAS DUE AND THE BREA.Qi 0CCURED 
In his treatise on the law of contracts, Professor Corbin says in 
9 
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Section 1005 that "CcXTipensation for the plaintiff's losses is t.o ti:·, 
with reference to the conditions existing at the tirre when r:erfomai 
is due and the contract is broken." 
In this case it was determined that the arrount of damages 'llJul: 
the arrount required to be paid for the ilrproverrents which the defere::. 
agreed but failed to provide. It is the defendants' contention, of 
course, that they provided all the ilrprovements which they agreed t 
provide in the contract. However, if it is found that they are res-t~ 
for other iirprovements, they smuld be responsible only for the 01~ 
those ilnprovements as of the tirre when they agreed and becarre obliS'~ 
to provide them. 
The evidence indicates that the cost of these improverrents has 1 
up rapidly in the tirre be~en contracting and the present. It is 
neither fair nor just for the defendants to be held resp:msible lo: 
these increases in prices which occured while the plaintiffs were 0:: 
nothing and had failed even to infonn the defendants of the allege:: 
breach. The trial court awarded damages as of a date b-.1'.) or three:~ 
after the alleged breach. This was error. 
POINT IV 
PIAINTIFFS HAD AN AFFIRMATIVE DUTY 'IO MITIGATE THEIR LOSSFS FXS 
THAN SIT IDLY BY WHILE GREATER AND GREATER DAMAGES ACCRUED· 
Clear 1 y, the law of contracts containes a rule that aarrages cc: ! 
to be mitigated if possible. The Restatement of Contracts 2d, Se:'~ 
1 
336 (1) states: "Damages are not recoverable for harm that plainu::: 
.I 
should have foreseen and could have avoided by reasonable efforts·,::: 
' 
undue risk, expense, or humiliation." The official cornrent on tJUS i 
. tli.t 
section says under (a): "After the plaintiff has reason to JmJI' 
10 
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breach has occured or that a breach is ilrpending under circumstances 
such that it is not reascnable for him to expect the defendant to prevent 
harTIJ, he is expected to take such steps to avoid harm as a prudent 
p:?rson would take. He cannot get damages for harm that could thus be 
avoided." 
This section of the Restatement harks back to the farrous con=ing 
opinion of Judge Cardozo in McClelland v. Climax Hosiery Mills, New 
York, 169 N.E. 605 (1930), in which he says that the usual measure of 
ciarrages in a breach of contract action is only a prima facie rreasure of 
ciarrages. The real measure of damages, he says, is to pay whatever damages 
have actually been suffered by the non-breaching party. These must 
exclude daniages that a party, acting reascnably, 'WOuld have diminished 
or avoided. 
That case involved an employment contract which was breached. The 
employee made no attempt to find other employment, and then scught to 
sue for the total wages that he 'WOuld have been paid over the period of 
the contract. Said Judge Cardozo: '"Ihe servant is free to accept employ-
rrent or reject it according to his uncenscred pleasure. What is 11Eant 
by this supposed duty is merely this: That if he tmreascnably rejects, 
c. he will not be heard to say that the loss of wages fran then on shall be 
deEmed the jural consequences of the earlier discharge. He has broken 
~i the chain of causation, a,-.d the loss resulting to him thereafter is 
su£fered through his own act. " 
The leading case in this area is the New York case of IDsei Realty 
~ration v. City of New York, 171 N.E. 899 (1930). In that case, 
the city had agreed to dredge sane underwater property belonging to the 
Plaintiff and build up the adjacent shoreline, thus !l'aking the property 
ll 
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a suitable place for ships to dock. The city failed to perfonn Pre;>~ 
The plaintiff sued for, arrong other things, darrages caused by dela" . 
,. 
completing the work. He was not allowed these darrages because he r•: 
stood idly by for nine rronths and allowed such darrages to acrunulato 
while doing nothing to avoid them. 
Said the court: 
"When ... the time arrives when a reasonable rran "'1:)uld give 
up hope of perfonnance, the plaintiff ~uld ro longer be 
justified in leaving the land idle and claiming dam3.ges for 
delay for an indefinite period. If it acted reasonably, it 
~uld be enti tied to recover the entire loss ... The law wisely 
imposes upon a party subjected to injury fran the breach of· 
a contract the active duty to make reasonable efforts to 
render the injury as light as possible. When the city failei 
to canplete its contract, the plaintiff was bound to use 
reasonable efforts to mitigate the damages. It has oo right, 
by obstinately persisting in treating the contract as alive, 
tJ make the darrages larger than they otherwise would have b:er1 
This general rule is restated in the recent Utah case of Unive.~. 
Club v. Invesco Holding Corporation, 29 Utah 2d 1, 504 P.2d 29 (1911 
In that case, the Utah Supreme Court said: 
"The recognized rule is that where one party definitely 
indicates that he can not or will not perform a a:mdition of 
a contract, the other is not bound to uselessly abide tme, :O;: 
may act upon the breached condition. Indeed, in appropriate 
circumstances he ought to do so to mitigate danages. 11 
In University Club, the corporate landlord failed to naintain 
proper air conditioning for the tenant business. The court was h:llii 
that the tenant was not required to sit idly by for thirty days, as 
required by the lease, before taking steps to make its danage as t:· 
as possible. It could then sue the defendant for oosts incurred i.'i 
doing so. 
AJ.rrost seven years have passed since this alleged cause of ac::: 
accrued. f 
er bring; 
The plaintiffs waited about four years be ore ev 
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I 
.. -1 
this action. There is evidence that the plaintiffs "Were, at tirres, 
ccrrpletely unable to use their driveway due to the muddy oondition of 
the road. There is also evidence that sorre or all of their neighl:ors 
nave cbne the paving work on their own through the use of a special 
urrproverrent district. It would have been possible for the plaintiffs to 
join in such a district. The evidence is clear that the oost of 
urrproverrents has skyrocketed in these intervening seven years. It does 
not seE!ll fair to require the defendants to provide the inlprovenents at 
their present inflated cost when, if they agreed to anything, they only 
agreed to provide the inlproverrents at the fonrer cost. It would have 
teen very possible, indeed reasonable and prudent, for the plaintiffs to 
provide the improverrents therrsel ves and then sue the defendants for their 
costs. The law imp::>ses a duty of mitigation when such circumstances and 
possibilities exist. As Judge Cardozo said, defendants are not responsible 
for clarrages which the plaintiffs could reasonably have prevented but 
failed to prevent. Thus, defendants are not legally responsible for the 
increased costs of improverrents which resulted from the plaintiffs' 
sitting on their hands and doing nothing about it. 
POINI' V 
IT WAS ERROR 'IO INCllJDE IN THE AM)lJNT OF ATIORNEY' S FEES AWARDED 
SUMS ATTRIBUTABLE 'IO MISTAKES MADE BY PLAINl'IFFS' FORMER ATI'ORNEY WHICH 
i1ERE: IN N) WAY THE FAULT OF THE DEFENDANTS. 
As noted in the facts staterrent, supra, the arrount of attorney's 
fees awarded by the trial oourt included sums attributable to pleadings 
preparea by the plaintiffs' fonrer attorney which had to be anended 
becauze they could not be supported. Such sums should not be included 
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in defendants damages, if a breach is found to have occurea, ~ti$: 
·1 
defendants are not, by any stretch of the imagination, restxinsibJe : 
them. 
'Ihis court has said in Wallace v. Build Inc. , 16 Utah 2d 401, 
P. 2d 699 (1965), that a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to only 
reasonable attorneys fees. What is "reasonable" is not, acoordirr.: 
the court, necessarily controlled by any set formula. Rather, it'-''.I 
I 
be judged according to a nunber of relevant factors. It is certai:: I 
not reasonable to hold the defendants responsible for the mistakes : 1 
others in which they had absolutely no part, nc natter how understa:4 
such mistakes may be. I 
CONCLUSION I 
I 
'Ihe trial court held as a matter of law that the Earnest Mire, I 
Agreement executed between these parties was not ambiguous and 1135: I 
corrplete integration intended by the parties to cover the whole of ·:I 
disputed subjects. Consequently, no evidence was pennitted as to:ij 
dealings of the parties, negotiations between them, or subsequent \ 
statements indicating their understanding of the contract. I 
'Ihe disputed term itself is far from clear and unambiguous. ::j 
the rrost criptic, sketchy reference imaginable to a subject of sig.'1 
import. Competent evidence of the intent of the parties w.ards ~cl 
patently ambiguous term was offered but refused. It should have re: 
accepted. I 
If the contract is to stand alone, it surely should stand alc:i 
only as it concerns subjects intended by the parties to be covere:::I 
ind · te the subie'.'; I it. 'Ihus, the law allows extrinsic evidence to ica i 
14 
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I 
I 
1 
J 
I 
~1 
atout which the agreerrent was intended to be a final integration. such 
evidence was, in this case, offered but refused. It should have been 
accepted. 
Finally, even if it is concluded that a breach occured, defendants 
have been required to pay an amount of damages calculated in a manner 
unjust and contrary to law. Unjust because it includes sums occasioned 
by the mistakes of others for which defendants' are not resp:msible, and 
contrary to law both because it measures damages as of a time long after 
perfo:rniance was due and breach occured and because plaintiffs' duty to 
mitigate their damages is ignored, causing the defendants to be charged 
with losses which they cannot reasonably be said to have caused. 
Defendants respectfully pray that the decision of the trial court 
be reversed, or, in the alternative, that the amount of damages be 
recalculated to reflect the sum properly due. 
'/, ,/ 
Sul::rnitted thi~ day of December, 1980. 
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MAILED Tu'O (2) copies of the foregoing Brief to Mr. Craig M. 
Snyder, H~, LEWIS & PEI'ERSON, Attorneys at Law, 120 East 300 Nor+J. 
Street, P.O. Box 778, Provo, Utah, 84601, on this al~y of Cecali:E:, 
1980. 
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